Descartes - Lecture 6
6. Descartes’ two set-piece arguments for the existence of God
One , the ontological argument, occurs in Meditation 5. (On the basis of the mind’s perception, for example, that it is necessarily contained in the idea of a triangle that its three angles should equal two right angles, we are entirely convinced that a triangle does have three angles equalling two right angles. Hence it would be inconsistent of us to refrain from concluding that God possesses the perfection of existence on the basis of our recognition that it is necessarily contained in our idea of God that God is a supremely perfect being.
In terms of the structure of the Meditations, at least, this argument appears to be something of an afterthought. In the Principles of Philosophy, however, the ontological argument is the first argument put forward in support of the conclusion that God exists.
The Trademark Argument
The argument that forms the principal object of discussion in this lecture occurs in Med 3, and it is often referred to as the ‘Trademark Argument’, because it is constructed around the thought that God has placed within us an idea of himself ‘to be, as it were, the mark of the craftsman stamped on his work’ (AT VII 51).
The starting point for the argument is the meditator’s recognition that amongst the ideas which he finds in himself is the idea of a supreme God who is ‘eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and the creator of all things that exist apart from him’ (AT VII 40).
This recognition encourages the Meditator to ask himself how he comes to possess this idea. And in the course of his reflections on this topic, he invokes a principle that he claims is manifest by the natural light, namely, the principle that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause of something as there is in that thing itself.
We can conveniently call this principle the Causal Adequacy Principle (CAP)
A tornado, for example, cannot begin to exist unless there is at least as much stored-up energy in the region of the atmosphere that gives rise to that tornado as the tornado itself possesses.
Similarly a molecule of water cannot come into existence unless the universe already contains all the basic building blocks (electrons, protons and neutrons) that will ultimately constitute that molecule.
Descartes’ own examples: heat cannot be produced in an object which was not previously hot, except by something of at least the same order of perfection as heat
A stone, for example, which previously did not exist, cannot begin to exist unless it is produced by something which contains, either formally or eminently everything to be found in the stone
An efficient cause is that which serves to bring something into existence
The total cause is the entire set of things and circumstances that is needed to account for some phenomenon coming into existence.
If the CAP is not taken as referring to total causes, then there would seem to be some obvious counter-examples – a small spark, for example, might legitimately be described as the cause of a large explosion. Taken by itself, however, the spark cannot wholly account for the explosion. One would also have to mention something on the lines of a substantial mass of high explosive or a highly flammable vapour or dust concentrated in a confined space.
Similarly, large trees can grow from small and insignificant seeds, but only by taking in a lot of nourishment from external sources as they grow
If an item possesses some feature F formally, it possesses it in the literal or strict sense.
If an item possesses F eminently, it possesses it in some higher or grander form.
Thus if I possess a sum of money formally, I actually have that money in my possession or in my bank account. But I could possess it eminently in the sense of having valuable non-monetary assets that could readily be sold in order to raise that sum of money
Even with these examples and definitions in place, however one might still be tempted to join Hobbes in questioning (Third Set of Objections) whether the idea of one existing thing possessing more reality than another existing thing is an intelligible one:
‘Does reality admit of more or less? Or does he think one thing can be more of a thing than another? If so, he should consider how this can be explained with that degree of clarity that every demonstration calls for, and which he himself has employed elsewhere’ AT VII 185
Two possible responses to Hobbes’ reservations
Descartes’ own:
‘A substance is more of a thing than a mode ... and if there is an infinite and independent substance, it is more of a thing than a finite and dependent substance. All this is completely self-evident.’
Taken literally, at least, this does not permit the kind of fine-grained distinctions that Descartes seems to have in mind.
Any substance is more real than any mode, and hence can be its total and efficient cause. Moreover any finite substance is as real as any other finite substance, and hence can be its total and efficient cause.
The suggestion that being more real than x should be glossed as having x’s positive attributes (perfections) and more besides.
Unfortunately the CAP interpreted in this way now looks distinctly shaky. The issue of genuinely emergent properties. Some of Descartes’ contemporaries raised the issue of the emergence of living things. Matter in motion. Less easily disposed of would be the phenomena of the emergence of consciousness and rational thought. Many of us would be inclined to think that consciousness is radically unlike anything to be found in the world before the evolution of extremely sophisticated animals. Similarly it might be suggested that the emergence of rational thought appears to be a positive development that is not presaged by anything that preceded it. Thus it seems that we can at least conceive of rational and conscious beings having positive attributes that are simply not found at all in the operations of the universe at earlier stages of evolution even though we are still regarding these earlier stages as causally responsible for later developments.
The issue of what underpins our tendency to endorse the CAP (if we are so inclined). Descartes presumably needs our grounds for accepting this to be independent of our experience of the objective physical world (after all at the point in the Meditations where Descartes introduces this argument for the existence of God, the meditator is still supposed to lack any justified beliefs about an world external to himself. Yet in so far as there are any persuasive ground s for taking the CAP seriously, these seem to come from our sense –based beliefs about such a world.
Our own conservation principles – mass, energy or the sum of two, conservation of momentum
Constraints on possible processes of causation or growth
The need to introduce the notion of representational content if the Trademark Argument is to have any chance of delivering the conclusion Descartes wants.
Objective reality: if an idea A represents an object x, then A’s objective reality depends upon the formal reality that x would possess if it were to exist. The greater that would be, the greater A’s objective reality is.
Moreover Descartes seems to say (comes close to saying) that the ultimate cause of an idea A that represents an object x must possess at least as much reality formally as the idea possesses objective.
It does seem to be true that complexity of representational content needs to be given a causal explanation.
A piece of paper with a few random lines drawn on it in biro drawn on in biro, versus a piece of paper with detailed instructions on how to build a fusion reactor.
Equivalent matter means equivalent formal reality, but the representational content means vastly different objective reality
Descartes’ own example: the idea of an intricate machine – Principles I, 17 AT VIII 11
Deriving the conclusion – the meditator cannot be the cause of his idea of God – his ignorance and errors. Therefore there is something other than the narrator that possesses formally all this reality that the idea of God has formally.
The dispersal objection – all the perfections but not assembled in one and the same thing – fictitious ideas – the unicorn.
Omnipotence – infinite power (assembled, constructed from an idea of power and our idea of the infinite?)
Descartes and the unity of our idea of God. Any more united than our idea of body and extension? Is Descartes counting the same thing twice?
The difference between a mere representation of something and a full representation of that thing
Everything depends upon how detailed and complete the representation is, how adequate the idea is.
Back to the machine – a complete and adequate representation of a machine would presumably give us the ability to build such a machine.
Our idea of God – how complete and adequate in those terms is this idea?
Do we have an idea at all about how to go about constructing a God (even with the aid of our supposedly God-given idea)?
No. Therefore in so far as we fall short of this capacity, our idea is not complete and hence its cause need not have all the reality that God would have if God existed.
 Descartes - Lecture 7 |
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