The Sceptical Tradition: Lecture 1(revised 08-03)
1. Introduction
The idea of a tradition
The emphasis in most histories of philosophy is placed firmly on exponents of positive philosophy – Kant, Descartes, Plato, even Locke.
These thinkers characteristically present unobvious truths to us as well-founded and discovered via the distinctive methods of philosophical inquiry.
However this positive affirmation of the powers of philosophy and the human intellect naturally tends to generate a reaction that calls into question this self-confidence. Philosophical scepticism as a key component of this critical tradition.
Criticising/questioning philosophy in an informed way without engaging in yet more philosophy. Such criticism readily spills over into a critique of common sense and empirical science.
Why is this tradition so neglected in the usual accounts of the history of philosophy? The issue of bias in such accounts. An instructive parallel: Malebranche, Bayle, and Hobbes are not included amongst the seven canonical philosophers of the early modern period even though they were immensely influential and famous when they were alive. However the canon we are familiar with today seems to have been put together in the 19th Century to meet the needs of universities in the USA. Thus it was constructed to reflect the importance of particular ethnic groups in that country, and there also seems to have been a noticeable bias against philosophers (in particular Hobbes) who were seen as having excessively reactionary and authoritarian political views.
Some Sceptics
Pyrrho: the nominal founder of the Pyrrhonean school of scepticism 360 – 270 BC
Arcesilaus: the man who converted Plato’s Academy to scepticism 315 – 240 BC
Carneades: perhaps the most formidable dialectician amongst the Academic sceptics 214 – 129 BC
Aenesidemus: a one-time member of the Academy who played a major role in the creation of Pyrrhonean scepticism as an on-going philosophical tradition, author/compiler of the ten tropes featured in Book One of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Active as a writer around 80 BC
Agrippa: cited by Diogenes Laertius as the author of the five tropes First century AD?
Sextus Empiricus: described by Laertius as head of the Pyrrhonean school Probably active as a writer at some point between AD 180 and c. AD 230
Saturninus: Sextus’ pupil
Montaigne: French nobleman, Catholic and fideist, author of the Apology for Raymond Sebond 1533-92
Francois La Mothe Le Vayer: French neo-Pyrrhonist and fideist, author of numerous sceptical works 17th C: one of Descartes’ contemporaries though he outlived Descartes by some twenty years
Pierre Bayle: author of highly influential Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, sceptical fideist, read extensively by Hume 1647 - 1706
Pierre-Daniel Huet: French Catholic Bishop and neo-Pyrrhonist. An English translation of his principal Pyrrhonean work was published in London in 1725 with the title Of the Weakness of Human Understanding. 1630 - 1721
David Hume: philosopher and historian 1711 - 1776
Some comparative dates: Democritus c. 460-380 BC, Plato 427-347 BC, Aristotle 384-322 BC, Cicero 106- 43 BC, Luther 1483-1546, Descartes 1596-1650, Locke 1632-1704.
‘Knowledge’ and Authority
Authority and the claim to be followed in some matter
Four sources of authority: power, charisma, tradition, and ‘knowledge’
Some admixtures of the four: taste, the prestige of office, gate-keeping
Problems with these sources. Raw coercion breeds resentment and, in many cases, violent resistance; charisma is a fickle commodity that depends for its effect on the mood of those who are being charmed; and traditions frequently find themselves overtaken by more innovative institutions and practices.
Unsurprisingly, then, ascriptions of knowledge play an increasing important role in supporting present-day claims to authority.
Instrumental v. contemplative ‘knowledge’
The potential social implications of challenging ascriptions of knowledge: scepticism as implicated in such challenges.
Uninteresting Scepticism
Targets ‘knowledge’ in some exaggeratedly strict sense of the term
Attempts to persuade us that there is some small chance that a belief is false
Cartesian sceptical hypotheses: dreams, demons, and brains in vats
At least some of the tendency to equate knowledge with absolute certainty seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the role the truth requirement for knowledge plays in that concept.
An uninteresting philosophical position because even if we were to concede that we don’t strictly know anything, we would still seem to be left with the capacity to make a broad range of telling epistemological distinctions
In particular, authority rests on being entitled to believe that some claim is true or likely to be true.
Action tied to expectation and psychological certitude rather than certainty
The off-putting nature of the sceptical hypotheses
The need to look for a form of scepticism that cuts deeper – scepticism about rational justification
Is it to be found in Sextus?
His reputation at least seems promising – the commonly accepted contrast between the epistemological fallibilism often ascribed to the Academics and the more radical position supposedly espoused by Sextus and other Pyrrhonean sceptics, Hume’s strictures against Pyrrhonean or ‘excessive’ scepticism.
 Scepticism - Lecture 2 |
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